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CHAPTER 11
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS AND STATE-OWNED  
ENTERPRISES AS CLAIMANTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS AND ICSID 
Chijioke Chijioke-Oforji
Introduction
The activities of Sovereign Wealth Funds (hereinafter SWFs) and State-
Owned Enterprises (hereinafter SOEs) are attracting increasing attention 
within academic and policymaking circles. Together, these entities under-
take a significant proportion of international capital market activity, in-
cluding but not limited to the acquisition of corporate firms and the own-
ership of trophy assets across the globe. Rather unsurprisingly, their foot-
prints in international private markets have provoked controversy. Scep-
tics often raise concerns about the national security risks posed by these 
entities, their goVernance apparatus and their potentially anti-competitive 
practices and effects. This has provoked a regulatory avalanche of sorts at 
the domestic and transnational policymaking levels. In the context of the 
former, host states are increasingly adopting policy defences which subject 
individual investments by SWFs and SOEs to national security and oth-
er foreign investment reviews. At the multilateral level however, soft law 
instruments like the OECD Guidelines for the Corporate Governance of 
state-owned enterprises and the Santiago Principles for Sovereign Wealth 
Funds have been devised to transform these investors into responsible and 
accountable market actors. Yet, the policy terrain for these entities remain 
highly charged, risking discriminatory and arbitrary treatment that might 
threaten or undermine their investments. This febrile regulatory environ-
ment has prompted a renewed focus into the forms of protection that may 
be available for SWFs and SOEs under International Investment Agree-
ments and tribunals constituted under the ICSID Convention. 
This chapter puts forward this inquiry in four sections. The first inves-
tigates the rise of SWFs and SOEs as international capital market actors. 
Under particular scrutiny here are the nature of these entities and the in-
vestment strategies adopted by them.  This section also examines the con-
cerns raised by these entities and the regulatory measures that have been 
devised in response to these concerns. The next section considers an over-
view of international investment law, including its basic features, rationale 
and the safeguards afforded to potential claimants. This is followed by the 
third section which is the nucleus of this chapter and which considers the 
situation of SWFs and SOEs as potential claimants under International In-
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vestment Treaties (IIAs) and before tribunals constituted under the ICSID 
Convention. This section focuses in particular on two jurisdictional hurdles 
typically faced by SWFs and SOEs. 
The first involves the question of whether the investment by the SOE 
or SWF is protected by the applicable Investment Agreement between its 
owner state and its host. This is particularly problematic because certain 
IIAs do not adequately distinguish between private and public investors in 
their definition of ‘covered investors’. This creates interpretative challenges 
for arbitral tribunals. Recent commentary however suggests that tribunals 
are likely to interpret such IIAs broadly so as to extend coverage to SOEs 
and SWFs. 
The second jurisdictional conundrum involves an analysis of whether 
the SOE or SWF has locus standi to assert its claim before the forum of 
its choice. In the context of the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID) which is the forum considered in this paper, 
this is most problematic. This is because the ICSID convention proscribes 
state-to-state dispute resolution, meaning that a tribunal faced with a claim 
by an SWF or SOE would have to conduct further analysis defined in the 
seminal Broches test to ascertain whether the entity is acting as an agent of 
its owner state or discharging an essentially governmental function. Upon 
an affirmative finding on either limb of the test, an ICSID tribunal is duty 
bound to decline jurisdiction and deny the state-owned entity access. This 
creates uncertainty as to the availability of ICSID arbitration for SWFs and 
SOEs, demanding a review of existing case law such the ICSID tribunal’s 
decision in CSOB v Slovakia and the recent decision in BUCG v Yemen. The 
final section briefly considers the implication of these decisions for SWFs 
and SOEs in seeking access to investment tribunals constituted under the 
ICSID convention.    
Sovereign Wealth Funds and State-Owned Enterprises as International 
Market actors
In an economic climate defined by a tepid recovery from the global eco-
nomic crisis, flat commodity prices and global macroeconomic imbalances, 
Sovereign Wealth Funds have emerged as crucial economic power hous-
es, investing public revenue and acquiring trophy assets across much of 
the developed world. Although existent –as the literature suggests since 
the 1950s – these funds have emerged from relative obscurity to establish 
themselves as important capital market actors in an increasingly fragment-
ed global financial order.1 
1 Xu Yi-Chong, The Political Economy of Sovereign Wealth Funds (Palgrave Macmillan 2010) 1.
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According to the International Monetary Fund, SWFs are “special pur-
pose public investment funds, or arrangements owned or controlled by 
the government, and which hold, manage, or administer assets primarily 
for medium to long-term macroeconomic and financial objectives.”2 These 
funds are commonly established out of official foreign currency operations, 
the proceeds of privatizations, fiscal surpluses, and/or receipts resulting 
from commodity exports.3 They employ a variety of investment strategies 
which include the acquisition of foreign financial assets such as bonds, 
shares and convertible instruments. They also invest in alternative asset 
classes such as infrastructure (including energy infrastructure), real estate, 
agribusiness and natural resources amongst others.4
The first SWFs were established in Middle Eastern countries,5 but these 
have since been joined by similar sovereign investment vehicles from coun-
tries like Norway, China and Russia amongst others. History suggests that 
the single biggest drivers in the establishment of SWFs can be tied to the 
expansion in exports from developing states, the rise in global energy and 
commodity prices over the last three decades and increasing stockpiles of 
foreign exchange reserves accumulated by energy exporting nations as a 
result.6 
The Government Pension Fund Global of Norway, thought to be the 
world’s largest SWF, was in 2017 estimated to hold over US$1 trillion in 
assets.7 Its holdings include sizeable stakes in blue chip private corpora-
tions such as Royal Dutch Shell, Apple, Barclays Plc and Alphabet amongst 
others.8 The Norway fund is closely followed by the China Investment Cor-
2 International Monetary Fund, Sovereign Wealth Funds- a Work Agenda, IMF (Feb 29, 
2008), 26 <http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2008/022908.pdf> Accessed 29 January 
2018.
3 Ibid
4 Preqin, Special Report: Sovereign Wealth Funds (2017),5 <http://docs.preqin.com/reports/
Preqin-Special-Report-Sovereign-Wealth-Funds-August-2017.pdf> Accessed 30 May 2018. 
5 The first official SWF is believed to be the Kuwait Investment Authority which was es-
tablished in 1953 see Xu Yi-Chong, The Political Economy of Sovereign Wealth Funds (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2010)1. There are however other accounts that trace the first SWFs to the US. See 
Paul Rose, American Sovereign Wealth (2011) Ohio State University, Public Law Working 
Paper No 161, 3. <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1960706> Accessed 
20 January 2018.
6 Paul Blyschak, ‘State-Owned Enterprises and International Investment Treaties: When 
are State-Owned Entities and their investments protected?’ (2011) 6(2) Journal of Interna-
tional Law and International Relations 1,5. See also, Edwin Truman, Sovereign Wealth Funds: 
Threat or Salvation (Peterson Institute for International Economics 2010) 20.
7 Mikael Holter and Sveinung Sleire, ‘The World’s Biggest Wealth Fund Hits $1 Trillion’ 
Bloomberg ( 19 September 2017) <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-19/nor-
way-wealth-fund-says-reached-1-trillion-in-value> Accessed 12 December 2017.
8 W Martins, ‘These are the stocks the world’s biggest sovereign wealth is putting its faith 
in’ Business Insider ( 31 August 2016) <http://uk.businessinsider.com/worlds-biggest-sov-
ereign-investment-fund-top-stock-holdings-2016-8/#10-blackrock-1> Accessed 20 January 
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poration and the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) with over US$ 
900 billion9 and US$ 800 billion of assets under management respectively.10 
Overall, SWFs are estimated to hold about US$ $7.2 trillion of assets under 
management, a significant part of which are thought to be in foreign-based 
assets. 
Besides their deep pockets, SWFs also pursue variegated policy goals 
and objectives for their owner states which include securing access to na-
tional resources (including energy and mineral resources), the stabilisation 
of national economies during economic downturns and the transfer of na-
tional wealth across generations.11 
The emergence of SWFs has coincided with the growth in the size and 
significance of another genus of state-owned investors – State-Owned En-
terprises (SOEs). These are not pools of sovereign capital like SWFs. They 
are rather commercial and corporate entities owned and controlled by 
states.12 Like SWFs, State-owned enterprises typically hail from emerging 
economies in the Middle East and China.13 They are also established for a 
variety of purposes which include engagement in sectors of strategic im-
portance to owner states both in the domestic economy but increasingly 
also in the international market place. 14
Like their SWF cousins, SOEs are making inroads into international 
capital markets. In the energy sector for instance, State-owned oil Corpo-
rations have dislodged the so-called seven sisters of Shell, BP, Chevron, 
Texaco, Exxon, Mobil and Total. Instead, state-owned energy giants like 
Petrochina, Sinopec, Saudi Aramco and Russia’s Gazprom now constitute 
the largest energy corporations across the globe. 15  
2018.
9 Xinhua, ‘China’s sovereign wealth fund hits 900 bln USD’ China Daily (7 October 2017). 
<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2017-10/07/content_32960068.htm> Accessed 20th 
January 2018.
10 Simon Kerr, ‘Abu Dhabi to combine two sovereign wealth funds into new $200bn vehi-
cle’ Financial Times (21 March 2018) <https://www.ft.com/content/a529b3f4-2cf9-11e8-a34a-
7e7563b0b0f4> Accessed 20 May 2018.
11 Udabair Das, Adnan Mazarei and Han Van der Hoorn, ‘Sovereign Wealth Funds and 
the Santiago Principles’ in Udabair Das, Adnan Mazarei and Han Van der Hoorn (eds), The 
Economics of Sovereign Wealth Funds (International Monetary Fund 2010) 60.
12 OECD, Guidelines for the Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises, OECD 
(2015),14 <https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/oecd-guidelines-on-corporate-gov-
ernance-of-state-owned-enterprises-2015_9789264244160-en#page16> Accessed 20 March 
2018.
13 Ibid at 11. 
14 Paul Blyschak, ‘State-Owned Enterprises and International Investment Treaties: When 
are State-Owned Entities and their investments protected?’ (2011) 6(2) Journal of Interna-
tional Law and International Relations 1,6.
15 Statista, 2018 ranking of the leading global oil and gas companies based on revenue (in 
billion U.S. dollars) (2018) <https://www.statista.com/statistics/272710/top-10-oil-and-gas-
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The activities of these entities are not limited to energy markets. There 
are also diversification drives into far-flung sectors such as Agri-business. 
An interesting example is the 2017 takeover of the European fertiliser firm 
Syngenta by the Chinese State-owned Enterprise, Chemchina. The same 
Chinese SOE had two years earlier acquired the Italian tyre company, 
Pirelli in a deal worth over seven billion euros. Both transactions raised 
concerns at the European Commission regarding Chemchina’s motives as 
well as the implication of the transaction for competition in the European 
agri-business sector.16
Western markets are not the only destination for State-owned enterpris-
es. These entities are also making inroads into developing and transition 
economies. Notable examples include the recent purchase of Namibian 
offshore oil assets by the Indian State-owned Oil and Gas Corporation, 
ONGC.17 ONGC’s internationalisation effort has also seen it acquire a 26 
percent stake in Vankorneft JSC, a Russian Oil and Gas giant.18 Further ex-
amples of this expansionist drive include Chinese SOEs that are increasing-
ly acquiring treasures troves in Africa’s mining sector.19  
Concerns about State-owned Enterprises and Sovereign Wealth Funds
As the operations of State-Owned Enterprises and Sovereign Wealth 
Funds have increased in size and scale, their activities in many host states 
have become the focus of rising policy and regulatory concern. Due to their 
nexus to owner states, investments made by SWFs and SOEs attract addi-
tional scrutiny from regulators in comparison to the investments of entities 
of a private character.20 
companies-worldwide-based-on-revenue/> Accessed 20 May 2018.
16 Rochelle Toplensky, ‘ChemChina takeover of Syngenta nears EU approval’ Financial 
Times ( 3 March 2017) <https://www.ft.com/content/44777ada-ff5c-11e6-96f8-3700c5664d30> 
Accessed 20 May 2018.
17 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2018: Investment and New Industrial Policies 
(2018), 49 <http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2018_en.pdf> Accessed 6 June 2018. 
18 Ibid.
19 Andrew England and Javier Blas, ‘China returns to hunt for African mine assets’ Finan-
cial Times (6 February 2014)<https://www.ft.com/content/7c2c6478-8f42-11e3-be85-00144fe-
ab7de> Accessed 6 June 2018.  For a broader discussion on the motivation of these enterpris-
es see Wenjie Chen, David Dollar, and Heiwai Tang, ‘Why is China investing in Africa? Evi-
dence from the firm level’ (2015)<https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/
Why-is-China-investing-in-Africa.pdf> Accessed 10 June 2018.  See also Xu Yi-Chong, ‘Chi-
nese State-owned Enterprises in Africa: ambassadors or freebooters?’ (2014) 23 Journal of 
Contemporary China, 822-840.
20 Paul Blyschak, ‘State-Owned Enterprises and International Investment Treaties: When 
are State-Owned Entities and their investments protected?’ (2011) 6(2) Journal of Interna-
tional Law and International Relations 1,7.
322
The top concern in regulatory circles is the fear that SWFs and SOEs 
may subjugate their commercial interests in favour of the political and for-
eign policy goals of their owner states.21 This is exacerbated by the fact that 
the largest SWFs and SOEs often hail from emerging market economies 
with obdurate foreign policy goals.22  These apprehensions, whether ra-
tional or not, have led to high profile incidents in the United states, Canada 
and the European Union which host a significant proportion of SWF and 
SOE  investments.23  
For instance, an attempt by Dubai Ports World, an SOE owned by the 
government of Dubai, to purchase a major Seaport in United States was 
truncated by Members of the US Congress who expressed hostile opinions 
regarding the national security implications of the deal.24 Likewise, a 2005 
attempt by the Chinese National Oil Corporation (CNOOC) to purchase 
the US energy firm Unocal was withdrawn after inordinate pressure by 
members of the US congress. Canada for its part has sought to restrict SOE 
and SWF investment in its energy sector. For instance, in response to the 
takeover of two Canadian energy firms by Chinese SOEs, ‘the then Prime 
Minister, Stephen Harper,’ announced that the deals were the “end of a 
trend” and that “going forward,” investments by Foreign SOEs in the Ca-
nadian oil sector will be found to be of net benefit “only in an exceptional 
circumstance”.25 In the European Union, these concerns have recently been 
expressed in the wake of increasing Chinese SOE investments across vast 
areas of the European economy. For instance, the incumbent European 
Commission President Jean Claude Juncker has recently called for an in-
vestment screening mechanism to “protect Europe’s collective security.”26 
Beyond national security concerns, SOEs and SWFs also raise concerns 
about governance, transparency and disclosure. Critics often point to the 
opaque structures and practices of some SWFs and SOEs, including the 
failure of certain funds and State-owned Enterprises to disclose annual re-
21 Joseph Norton , ‘The “Santiago Principles” and the International Forum of Sovereign 
Wealth Funds: Evolving Components of the New Bretton Woods II Post-Global Financial 
Crisis Architecture and Another example of Ad Hoc Global Administrative Networking and 
Related “soft” Rulemaking ?’ [2010] 29 Review of Banking & Financial Law 465,466.
22 Edwin Truman, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Threat or Salvation (Peterson Institute for Interna-
tional Economics 2010) 41.
23 Paul Blyschak, ‘State-Owned Enterprises and International Investment Treaties: When 
are State-Owned Entities and their investments protected?’ (2011) 6(2) Journal of Interna-
tional Law and International Relations 1, 7.
24 ibid 8.
25 Angela Avery, Peter Glossop, and Paula Olexuik, ‘Foreign Investment in Canada’s Oil 
and Gas Sector: New and Emerging Challenges’ (2013) 51(2) Alberta Law Review 344, 370. 
26 James Kynge and Michael Peel, ‘Brussels rattled as China reaches out to Eastern Europe’ 
Financial Times (27 November 2017) <https://www.ft.com/content/16abbf2a-cf9b-11e7-9dbb-
291a884dd8c6> Accessed January 20 2018. 
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ports and information about their asset allocation.27 Others inveigh against 
the perceived lack of operational independence between certain funds and 
the apparatus of their owner states which raise fears that investment deci-
sions may be made on non-economic grounds.28  
Besides governance concerns, SOEs and SWFs also raise issues about 
market distortion and competition. Here, it is often asserted that SWFs and 
SOEs do not operate on a level playing field with other private market op-
erators.29 Critics cite, in particular, the ‘undue advantages’ that SWFs and 
SOEs can enjoy by virtue of their nexus to owner states.30 These include 
forms of direct subsidisation, concessionary financing, state-backed guar-
antees, preferential regulatory treatment and exemptions from antitrust 
enforcement or bankruptcy rules. Whilst these may be less inimical in a 
domestic context, their extension beyond national borders may crowd out 
private actors and undermine international trade and investment.31
Regulatory responses to SWFs and SOEs
The concerns examined above have elicited regulatory responses across 
recipients of sovereign capital. These include national foreign investment 
screening measures which seek to assess individual investments by SOEs 
and SWFs for national security risks. The US Foreign Investment and Na-
tional Security Act 2007 is the most notable of these measures.32 It empow-
ers the Committee for Foreign Investments in the US (CFIUS) – a secretive 
Inter-departmental agency of the US government – to screen investments 
by SWFs and SOE for national security risks and to make recommendations 
to the US President as to whether to prohibit or bar the said investment.33 
27 Wouter Schmit Jongbloed, Lisa Sachs and Karl Sauvant, ‘Sovereign Investment: An Intro-
duction’ in Karl Sauvant, Lisa Sachs and Wouter Schmit Jongbloed (eds) Sovereign Investment: 
Concerns and Policy Reactions (Oxford University Press, 2012) 14. See also Anne-Sylvainne 
Chassany, ‘QIA leads fund rankings for missing Santiago governance standards’ Financial 
Times (27 October 2014)<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b6000716-5b81-11e4-b68a-00144feab-
7de.html#axzz4C9bNBFrJ> Accessed 2 June 2018.
28 Ibid.
29 OECD, State-Owned Enterprises as International Competitors: A Challenge or Oppor-
tunity, 51 (2016) <https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/finance-and-investment/state-owned-enter-
prises-as-global-competitors_9789264262096-en#page3> Accessed 20 May 2018.
30 Ibid.
31 Max Büge, Matthias Egeland, Przemyslaw Kowalski, and Monika Sztajerowska, ‘State-
owned enterprises in the global economy: Reason for concern?’ VoxEU (2 May 2013) <https://
voxeu.org/article/state-owned-enterprises-global-economy-reason-concern> Accessed 20 
March 2018.
32 Mark Clodfelter & Francesca Guerrero, ‘National Security and Foreign Government 
Ownership Restrictions on Foreign Investment: Predictability for Investors at the National 
Level’ in  Wouter Schmit-Jongbloed, Lisa Sachs and Karl Sauvant,(eds) Sovereign Invest-
ment: Concerns and Policy Reactions(Oxford University Press 2012) 178.
33 Ibid.
324
The US approach is also mirrored in Canada and Australia where the 
Investment Canada Act34 and Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act35 
empowers government departments to screen inward investments by 
SOEs and SWFs according to the net benefit and national interest tests. 
European countries have followed suit. Germany and Italy are notable for 
having strengthened their policy defences in response to increasing Sover-
eign investment activity. Germany has for instance implemented measures 
in the Foreign Investments Act 2009 which require acquisitions by foreign 
state-owned entities beyond a 25 percent threshold to be scrutinised for 
national security risks.36 
For the most part, these screening mechanisms are subjective and of-
ten cumbersome.37 Also, reviewing authorities such as the CFIUS possess 
largely unfettered discretion and decision-making power.38  Critics have 
also argued that these agencies may cave into political pressure, forcing 
them to make decisions that satisfy narrow political considerations but 
adversely affect the investments of SWFs and SOEs. There is also the ad-
ditional risk that SWFs and SOEs may be subject to hostility and arbitrary 
treatment even after their investments have been admitted into the host 
state.39 
Beyond domestic regulatory frameworks, there are also transnational 
soft law instruments such as the Santiago Principles for SWFs40 and the 
OECD guidelines for SOEs41 which emphasise the need for disclosure, 
transparency, operational independence and risk management for SWFs 
and SOEs. These measures, like the domestic law mechanisms discussed 
above, provide additional safeguards for the recipients of sovereign capi-
tal by seeking to transform these entities into responsible and accountable 
market actors. However, they do not adequately address the equally cru-
34 RSC 1985, c 28 (1st Supp) [ICA].
35 the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeover Act 1975 (Cth) (FATA).
36 Mark Thatcher, ‘Western Policies towards SWF Equity Investments: A Comparison of 
the UK US and EU’ (2013) LSE Policy Brief No 2 <http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/programmes/
kuwait/documents/Thatcher-policy-brief.pdf>   Accessed 11 February 2018. 
37 Paul Blyschak, ‘State-Owned Enterprises and International Investment Treaties: When 
are State-Owned Entities and their investments protected?’ (2011) 6(2) Journal of Interna-
tional Law and International Relations 1, 13.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 International Working Group, ‘Sovereign Wealth Funds: Generally Accepted Principles 
and Practices’ (2008) < http://www.ifswf.org/sites/default/files/santiagoprinciples_0_0.pdf > 
Accessed 30 March 2018.
41 OECD, ‘Guidelines for the Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises’ (2015),14 
<https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/oecd-guidelines-on-corporate-governance-of-
state-owned-enterprises-2015_9789264244160-en#page16> Accessed 20 March 2018.
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cial question of how to protect the investments of SOEs and SWFs from the 
whims and caprices of their hosts. 
Given the highly charged political environment that SOEs and SWFs 
operate in, it is not unlikely that their investments may be adversely affect-
ed by the policy measures of host states. It is also probable that SOEs and 
SWFs may be subject to discriminatory, arbitrary and capricious treatment 
motivated by narrow political considerations. This warrants an inquiry 
into the forms of protection that may be available to SWFs and SOEs in the 
realms of International Investment Law and the ability of these entities to 
seek redress where such illegitimate treatment is alleged to have occurred.
An Overview of International Investment Law 
Before turning to the specific issues that are the focus of this chapter, 
it is important to review some of the fundamentals of international invest-
ment law. 
 International Investment Law is a subdivision of International Eco-
nomic Law that is predicated upon the protection of foreign proprietary 
interests from the whims and caprices of the host state in which the said in-
terests are situated or located.42 Investment Law is also distinguished from 
other aspects of Economic Law by the provision of forms of direct legal 
redress that can be activated by an injured private party against a host state 
in which the former operates.43 
The corpus of contemporary International Investment Law is woven 
around a range of regulatory instruments such as bilateral investment trea-
ties, bilateral and regional free trade agreements with investment chap-
ters and sector-specific investment agreements such as the Energy Charter 
Treaty (ECT).44 Together, these instruments are characterised as Interna-
tional Investment Agreements (IIAs) and were first developed in the after-
math of the Second World War to guard against renewed hostility between 
states and to promote cross-border cooperation, trade and investment.45 
IIAs promote cross-border capital and investment flows in two ways. 
First, they oblige host states to provide certain safeguards to foreign inves-
42 Krista .N Schefer, International Investment Law: Text, Cases and Materials (Edward Elgar 
2013) 1.
43 Elizabeth Whitsitt and Todd Weiler, ‘Sovereign Wealth Funds and Bilateral Investment 
Treaties’ new models: Issues, new trends and State Practice’ in F Bassan (eds) Sovereign 
Wealth Funds and International Investment Law(Edward Elgar, 2015) 279.
44 Ibid.
45 Paul Blyschak, ‘State-Owned Enterprises and International Investment Treaties: When 
are State-Owned Entities and their investments protected?’ (2011) 6(2) Journal of Interna-
tional Law and International Relations 1, 14. 
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tors. These safeguards include guarantees of National Treatment, Fair and 
Equitable treatment, Most Favoured Nation Treatment and Compensation 
in the event of actions tantamount to direct or indirect expropriation.46 Sec-
ondly, IIAs afford foreign investors the right to initiate arbitral proceedings 
against a host state in whose jurisdiction the investor operates. By invok-
ing the dispute settlement provisions in an IIA, the foreign investor avers 
that the host state has committed an infraction of the protective standards 
embedded within the relevant treaty.47  Common fora for proceedings of 
this kind include the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID) – which was established under the auspices of the World 
Bank in the 1960s for the settlement of investment disputes between host 
states and private nationals of other states.48  Having considered a broad 
overview of contemporary investment law, it is important to situate SWFs 
and SOEs as claimants within its realms.
Sovereign Wealth Funds and SOEs as Claimants under IIAs and ICSID
Given the concerns that the operations of State-controlled investors 
(SWFs and SOEs) raise in host states, it is not inconceivable that their in-
vestments may be threatened and that disputes might ensue. This chapter 
argues that Treaty-based arbitration presents a plausible dispute resolu-
tion mechanism.49 
In considering whether SWFs and SOEs are entitled to pursue claims 
before Investment Tribunals, there are typically two jurisdictional hurdles. 
For one, it is important to establish that the concerned entity is a covered 
‘investor’ within the ambit of the International Investment Agreement (IIA) 
between its home state and its host.50  In addition, the SWF or SOE would 
have to satisfy the jurisdictional constraints of the relevant arbitral tribunal 
where it seeks to pursue its claim. These hurdles are explained below. 
Jurisdictional Hurdle 1
The question of protection for SWFs and SOEs under an IIA depends on 
the provisions of the relevant investment treaty, in particular, its definition 
of investor.51 In this context, two broad approaches are discernible. 
46 Ibid
47 Elizabeth Whitsitt and Todd Weiler, ‘Sovereign Wealth Funds and Bilateral Investment 
Treaties’ new models: Issues, new trends and State Practice’ in F Bassan (eds) Sovereign 
Wealth Funds and International Investment Law (Edward Elgar, 2015) 280.
48 Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (1st edn 
CUP, 2010) 299.
49 Julian Chaisse and Dini Sejko, ‘Investor State Arbitration Distorted’ in Leila Choukroune 
(eds), Judging the State in International Trade and Investment Law (Springer, 2016) 87.
50 ibid 91.  
51 Mark Feldman, ‘The Standing of State-Owned Entities under Investment Treaties’ in 
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In the first instance, there are certain IIAs that define the notion of 
‘investor’ in broad terms without specific regard to the governmental or 
private nature of covered entities. These ownership-blind treaties merely 
accentuate the nationality or place of incorporation of protected entities.52 
Notable examples include the Singapore–China BIT which defines ‘inves-
tor’ with sufficient breadth to include:
(i) In respect of the People’s Republic of China, a company or other 
juridical person incorporated or constituted in its territory in ac-
cordance with its laws;
(ii) In respect of Singapore, any company, firm, association or body, 
with or without legal personality, incorporated, established or reg-
istered under the laws in force in the Republic of Singapore.53
This approach is mirrored in the India-Turkmenistan BIT which defines 
covered entities as “every juridical person, associations, firms, companies 
and other societies or unions with the rights of a juridical entity founded 
in accordance with the legislation of Turkmenistan and located on its ter-
ritory.”54  
In such a situation, the question of whether a SWF or SOE is a covered 
investor under the IIA would presumably be a matter for interpretation at 
tribunal level and an arbitral tribunal faced with such a thorny issue would 
most likely adopt an interpretative analysis under article 31(1) of the Vien-
na Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).55 Recent commentary how-
ever suggests that tribunals are likely to adopt a laissez-faire interpretation 
of such IIAs so as to extend coverage to state-owned entities.56 
Conversely however, certain IIAs provide explicit coverage for entities 
of a governmental or state-controlled nature, including SWFs and SOEs. 
Such an approach is visible in Bilateral Investment treaties entered into 
Karl P. Sauvant, (eds), Yearbook on International Investment Law & Policy 2010/2011 (New York: 
OUP, 2011) 631.
52 Ibid.
53 Agreement between the Government of the Peoples Republic of China and the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Singapore on the promotion and protection of investments (signed 
21 November 1985, entered into force 4 December 1986) (‘China-Singapore BIT’) Article 3.
54 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of 
Turkmenistan for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (signed 20 September 1995, 
entered into force 20 February 1996)(‘India-Turkmenistan BIT’) Article 1.
55 Elizabeth Whitsitt and Todd Weiler, ‘Sovereign Wealth Funds and Bilateral Investment 
Treaties’ new models: Issues, new trends and State Practice’ in F Bassan (eds) Sovereign 
Wealth Funds and International Investment Law (Edward Elgar, 2015) 291.
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by Arab states such as the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar.57 Inter-
estingly also, these states are home to some of the largest SWFs and SOEs 
in the world.58 By way of example, all six Saudi-Arabia BITs entered into 
in the years 2000-2011 contain a similar definition of ‘investor’ which ex-
pressly references its SWF, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA).59 
Similarly, 25 out of 27 UAE BITs ratified between 1992 and 2011 contain 
a definition of investor that mentions specific SWFs and state-owned en-
terprises in its definition of covered investor.60 Equally, BITs entered into 
by the Kingdom of Kuwait explicitly mentions its SWF, the Kuwait In-
vestment Authority, within its definition of Investor. Indeed, the 1997 Ku-
wait–Germany BIT goes even further by defining investor to include ‘the 
government of the state of Kuwait acting directly or indirectly through its 
SWF, the Kuwait Investment Authority.’61 
Explicit coverage for SWFs and SOEs is not just a matter for Arab IIAs. 
Indeed, several non-Arab treaties extend protection to state-owned inves-
tors such as SWFs and SOEs. Notable examples include the NAFTA treaty 
which defines ‘investor’ as ‘any entity constituted or organized under ap-
plicable law, whether or not for profit, and whether privately-owned or 
governmentally-owned, including any corporation, trust, partnership, sole 
proprietorship, joint venture or other association.’62 The 2012 United States 
Model Investment Treaty also adopts the NAFTA approach with a similar 
definition of investor.63 Where (as in the examples cited above) the protec-
tion of an IIA is explicitly extended to SWFs and SOEs, the ordinary mean-
ing of the IIA pursuant to Article 31(1) of the VCLT will prevail, allowing 
the SWF or SOE to assert its status as an investor under the applicable IIA 
and to pursue its claim before an arbitral tribunal. 
Jurisdictional Hurdle 2
Besides the preliminary hurdle embedded in the applicable investment 
treaty, a SWF or SOE would also have to scale through the jurisdictional 
requirements of the relevant arbitral tribunal to which it seeks to submit its 
57 Elizabeth Whitsitt and Todd Weiler, ‘Sovereign Wealth Funds and Bilateral Investment 
Treaties’ new models: Issues, new trends and State Practice’ in F Bassan (eds) Sovereign 
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claim. In the case of ICSID, the most popular forum for the adjudication of 
investment treaty disputes, this is most controversial.64 
For a start, the ICSID Convention provides in Article 25 that a dispute 
shall arise between a contracting state and a national of another contracting 
party.65 This is often interpreted to mean disputes between a contracting 
state and a private investor.66 Two factors support this view. First, the Con-
vention was originally intended to apply to private, but not public foreign 
investment. Indeed, its preamble67 and the Report of ICSID Executive Di-
rectors make several allusions to the purpose of the convention which is to 
stimulate private capital flows and to facilitate private foreign investment.68 
Second, the convention and its institutional creation (ICSID) were es-
tablished to address the procedural imbalance which existed between 
state-to-state disputes (which could be adjudicated at fora such as the In-
ternational Court of Justice), and disputes between private entities (which 
can be resolved domestically or via commercial arbitration).69 Taking this 
view, it would appear that SWFs and SOEs which are instrumentalities 
of states might not qualify as ‘a national of another contracting party’ as 
required by Art 25 of the ICSID Convention.70 
Yet, there are limited instances in which ICSID tribunals are able to 
assume jurisdiction in proceedings involving State-owned entities. These 
instances are explained by what is now known in ICSID parlance as the 
‘Aron Broches test.’ This test devised by Aron Broches, one of the principal 
drafters of the convention, allows a tribunal to assume jurisdiction in a 
case involving a state-owned investor where the concerned investor does 
not act as an agent of its home state or does not discharge an essential-
ly governmental function but is instead acting in a commercial capacity.71 
Broches set out his reasoning in a 1972 paper as follows:
‘In today’s world the classical distinction between private and public 
investment, based on the source of the capital, is no longer meaningful, if 
64 Lauge N.S. Poulsen, ‘Investment Treaties and the Globalisation of State Capitalism: Op-
portunities and Constraints for host states’ in R. Echandi and P. Sauve, Prospects in Interna-
tional Investment Law and Policy (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 77.
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not outdated…. It would seem, therefore, for the purposes of the conven-
tion that a mixed economy company or government-owned corporation 
should not be disqualified as a “National of another Contracting state” un-
less it is acting as an agent for the government or is discharging an essen-
tially governmental function (emphasis added)’72 
Although welcome, this test has often provoked controversy in arbitral 
settings. The most troubling aspect for tribunals is precisely what Broches 
meant by ‘acting as agent for the government’ and ‘discharging an essen-
tially governmental function.’ The leading decision in this sphere is the 
decision of the ICSID Tribunal in Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, A.S v 
the Slovak Republic.73 
The case concerned CSOB, a Bank owned by the government of the 
Czech Republic which in 1993 entered into a series of arrangements with 
the Slovak Republic and other related parties. In addition, CSOB entered 
into a loan agreement with a Slovak Collection company whose debt obli-
gations were guaranteed by the Slovakian state. When the Company failed 
to honour its obligations under the loan agreement and the Slovak State 
in turn failed to fulfil its guarantee, CSOB filed a claim for arbitration be-
fore an ICSID tribunal alleging an infraction of the BIT between its home 
state (the Czech Republic) and the Slovak Republic.74 As is often the case in 
proceedings involving a state-owned investor, the respondent (the Slovak 
state) began by challenging the tribunal’s jurisdiction under the BIT and 
the ICSID Convention arguing, in particular, that the dispute was in effect 
a state-to-state dispute between the Slovak State and its Czech counterpart 
and that CSOB was acting as an agent of its owner.75
The ICSID tribunal began its analysis of Slovakia’s objection by aver-
ring that Article 25(1) of its constituting convention leaves no doubt that 
ICSID tribunals have no jurisdiction over disputes between states. The 
tribunal also noted that the article simply states that potential claimants 
would have to be ‘nationals’ of contracting states in order to be granted 
standing. The tribunal further examined the accompanying provision – Ar-
ticle 25(2) in which the term ‘national’ was declared to include both natural 
and juridical persons and nothing more.76 Due to the lack of clarity in both 
72 Aron Broches, Selected essays, World Bank, ICSID, and other subjects of public and pri-
vate international law (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995)167. 
73 Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka A.S. v The Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4, De-
cision on Jurisdiction (24 May 1999) <https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-docu-
ments/ita0144.pdf> Accessed 20 April 2018. 
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid para 10. 
76 Ibid para 16.
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provisions, the tribunal turned to the legislative history of the ICSID con-
vention for guidance. 
Here, the tribunal identified the seminal 1972 statement of Aron Broch-
es (discussed above) as the determinative test. In particular, it was per-
suaded by Broches’ suggestion that the jurisdictional barrier on state-state 
disputes did not preclude wholly or partially government-owned corpora-
tions from pursuing arbitral claims before ICSID tribunals.77 
In reaching a decision on its jurisdiction, the tribunal examined the ele-
ments of the test.  It will be recalled that the test is divided into two limbs. 
The first requires an analysis of whether the state-owned investor is act-
ing as an agent of its home state and the second calls for an inquiry into 
whether the concerned entity is discharging an essentially governmental 
function. 
As to the first limb, the CSOB Tribunal conceded that CSOB ‘had act-
ed on behalf of the state’ in executing international banking and foreign 
commercial operations that the Czech state wished to support.78 It further 
conceded that the Czech state’s control of CSOB (65 percent at the time of 
the claim) meant that it was required to do its bidding.79 Rather controver-
sially, the tribunal refrained from making a full determination on the agen-
cy limb, it instead went on to discuss the second part of the Broches test 
which requires an examination of whether the investor was discharging an 
essentially governmental function.
Regarding the second limb, the tribunal again acknowledged the Czech 
state’s majority ownership of CSOB. Crucially also, it highlighted CSOB’s 
role in promoting the ‘policies or purposes’ of the Czech state.80 More 
controversially however, the tribunal emphasised that, in the light of the 
Broches test, both observations would not be determinative. It instead held 
that a determination of whether CSOB’s investment constituted an ‘essen-
tially governmental function’ should focus on the nature of its investment 
rather than the purpose.81 In other words, it was immaterial that CSOB had 
functioned to promote the policies of its home government (as conceded 
by the tribunal), the crucial issue was that it acted in a commercial capacity 
in providing financing facilities to the Slovak state and its corporations.82 
Having reached this position, the tribunal dismissed the Slovak state’s ob-
jection. 







Although the CSOB decision represents a significant clarification on the 
requirements of Art 25 of the ICSID convention, it is not immune from 
criticism. For one, the tribunal’s treatment of the agency limb of the Broch-
es test is suspect. It would be recalled that the Broches test is formulated 
in a disjunctive way. Its limbs are separated by the word “or”. Therefore, 
the test clearly calls for two separate and discrete inquiries.83 First, it asks 
whether the state-owned entity is acting as an “agent for the government” 
or whether the entity is “discharging an essentially governmental func-
tion.” If either of these limbs are satisfied, the ICSID Convention will pre-
sumably not apply to protect the relevant state-owned entity, meaning that 
the tribunal must decline jurisdiction.84 However in the CSOB case, the tri-
bunal appeared to apply the test in a conjunctive way. 
Regarding the issue of agency, it found that “it cannot be denied that 
for much of its existence, CSOB acted on behalf of the state in facilitating or 
executing the international banking transactions and foreign commercial 
operations the state wished to support.” In other words, the tribunal es-
tablished that for a protracted period of time, CSOB had acted as an agent 
‘on behalf’ of a disclosed principal (the Czech State) and that it was at the 
behest of the principal for much of its operations. Rather than conclude 
that CSOB therefore did not qualify as a national of a contracting state un-
der Mr Broches’ disjunctive articulation and therefore decline jurisdiction, 
the tribunal instead went on to consider the second part of the test where 
it based its decision to assume jurisdiction. This is most improper from a 
procedural perspective.85 
Besides the above, the Tribunal’s treatment of the second limb of the 
Broches test is also open to criticism. By according significant weight to the 
nature of CSOB’s investment rather than its purpose and goals, the tribunal 
rejected a crucial line of inquiry which may have been useful in demon-
strating whether the entity was in fact discharging an essentially govern-
mental function. Indeed in many instances, the goals and purposes of a 
particular entity or its investments may be crucial in determining whether 
its activities are commercial or not. Some may even argue that it is impos-
sible to separate the nature of an activity from its purpose.86  Returning to 
CSOB, it can therefore be argued that the failure to sufficiently consider 
83 Mark Feldman, ‘The Standing of State-Owned Entities under Investment Treaties’ in 
Karl P. Sauvant, (eds), Yearbook on International Investment Law & Policy 2010/2011 (New York: 
OUP, 2011) 630.
84 Ibid.
85 Paul Blyschak, ‘State-Owned Enterprises and International Investment Treaties: When 
are State-Owned Entities and their investments protected?’ (2011) 6(2) Journal of Interna-
tional Law and International Relations 1, 34.
86 Ibid 31.
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the broader framework of an entity’s purpose, motivations or goals could 
result in a situation where a tribunal is unable to fully appreciate whether 
what it is faced with is essentially a state-to-state claim or an investor-state 
dispute. It is submitted that these facts are too important to ignore.    
The many limitations of the CSOB decision were again thrown into 
sharp relief in the 2017 decision of an ICSID tribunal in BUCG v Yemen, 
a case involving a Chinese state-owned Enterprise and the Yemeni state.87 
The dispute arose out of the termination of BUCG’s contract for the con-
struction of an airport terminal in the Yemeni city of Sana’a. BUCG con-
tended that the Yemeni state unlawfully deprived it of its investment by 
employing military forces and security agencies to detain and assault its 
employees thereby forcibly denying it access to the construction site. 
The Yemeni state on the other hand retorted that BUCG had failed in 
multiple respects to perform the construction contract satisfactorily. It cit-
ed, in particular, instances of the unauthorised removal of materials, im-
portation of equipment without customs authority, lengthy absence of key 
BUCG personnel and recurring problems with subcontractors.88 The Yeme-
ni state also filed an objection to the tribunal’s jurisdiction contending that 
BUCG did not qualify as “a national of another contracting party” under 
Article 25 of the ICSID Convention. Importantly also, the respondent based 
its objection on the Broches test under which it alleged that BUCG was both 
an agent of the Chinese State and that it discharged governmental func-
tions even in its ostensibly commercial undertakings.89 
Rather unsurprisingly, BUCG countered that it was a “national of an-
other Contracting state” under the Convention and that it had locus standi 
to pursue claims against the Yemeni state before the Tribunal. BUCG fur-
ther accepted that the Broches test was determinative in assessing its claim 
to locus standi. It also submitted that it did not in any way act as the agent 
of the Chinese state nor did it discharge any governmental functions in 
making its investment in Yemen.90  
In its interpretative exercise, the tribunal first considered the absolute 
jurisdictional bar to state-state disputes under Article 25 of the ICSID con-
vention.91 It also clarified that the convention is not open to State-Owned 
entities as claimants when acting as agents of their home state or when 
87 Beijing Urban Construction Group Co Ltd v The Republic of Yemen, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/14/30, Decision on Jurisdiction, (31 May 2017) <https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/






engaged in activities that are tantamount to the discharge of a governmen-
tal function.92 It further accepted the parties’ contention that the Broches 
test is the functional approach in these circumstances.93 Importantly also, 
the tribunal acknowledged the disjunctive nature of the test – a welcome 
change from the Tribunal in CSOB.94 The BUCG tribunal further noted the 
application of the Broches test in the CSOB case and the focus of the CSOB 
tribunal on a context-specific analysis of the commercial function of the in-
vestment – a reasoning which the BUCG tribunal suggested that it agreed 
with.95 Having set the tone, the tribunal turned to an examination of each 
limb of the Broches test. 
Regarding the first limb which asks whether the state-owned entity is 
acting as an agent of the Chinese Government, the Tribunal accepted that 
BUCG was a publicly funded and wholly state-owned entity established 
by the Chinese State.96 It further noted the Yemeni state’s reliance on a va-
riety of Chinese government documents and directives which demonstrat-
ed that BUCG was expected to advance China’s national interest. It noted, 
in particular, evidence that BUCG was subject to the overall control of a 
board that was “representative of the state’s interests.”97  It also highlighted 
documents tendered before it, which suggested that BUCG was under the 
supervision and inspection of the Beijing State-owned Assets Supervision, 
the Administrative Bureau and the Beijing Finance Bureau – all govern-
ment organs responsible for the administration of state-owned assets.98 
More interestingly, the tribunal noted evidence tendered by the respond-
ent which suggested that BUCG like several other Chinese State-owned 
Enterprises had Communist party committees and cells which focused not 
only on supervising human resources but also on monitoring an SOE’s im-
plementation of national policies.99 
In its determination of the agency branch of the Broches test, the tribu-
nal rejected the above submissions as decisive. It instead averred that forms 
of corporate controls and mechanisms were not surprising in the context of 
Chinese State-owned corporations. It presumably based this reasoning on 
the fact that China’s command and control economy has been a matter of 
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the relevant issue was not the existence of frameworks and controls gov-
erning the SOE but whether BUCG functioned as an agent of its home state 
in the fact-specific context i.e. the construction of an airport terminal in the 
Yemen.101 
Regarding this point, the tribunal concluded that the evidence before it 
did not support an agency nexus between the Chinese state and BUCG.  To 
explain its reasoning, the tribunal cited evidence which showed that BUCG 
participated in the airport project as a general contractor and that it had 
undergone a competitive bidding process in which its tender was selected 
on its “commercial merits”.102 The tribunal also noted that BUCG’s contract 
had been terminated not for reasons associated with the “PRC’s decisions 
or policies” but for reasons supposedly associated with its performance on 
the construction contract.103 With this in mind, the tribunal surmised that 
BUCG was in fact performing its operations on the Airport site as a com-
mercial actor and not as an agent of its home state, the Peoples Republic 
of China. 
The tribunal’s treatment of the second limb of the Broches test also mer-
its attention. Its approach mirrors the style and substance of its treatment 
of the agency limb. For instance, the tribunal began by describing the at-
tempt of the Yemeni state to situate BUCG within the broader context of 
China’s state-directed economy as “convincing but largely irrelevant.”104 
It also rejected Yemen’s rather illuminating submissions which included 
evidence that much of the cross border transactions undertaken by BUCG 
were to be “administered, coordinated and regulated” by the Chinese For-
eign Economic and Trading department.105 Also rejected was the respond-
ent’s contention that the Chinese state was the ‘ultimate decision maker for 
key management, operational and strategic decisions.’106 Here, the tribunal 
described the evidence as “too remote from the facts of the Sana’a Interna-
tional Airport project to be relevant.”107 It then concluded that BUCG was 
‘clearly not exercising a Chinese governmental function on the airport site 
in Yemen.’108 Its conclusion was predicated on the facile ground that the 
alleged military aggression against BUCG’s investment was not against its 
2018.
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owner state, the Peoples Republic of China but in relation to BUCG as an 
airport contractor.
Although the BUCG decision provides an additional clarification of the 
scope and application of the Broches test and the approach of ICSID tri-
bunals to the locus standi of state-owned entities, it is nonetheless fraught 
with difficulties. For one, the context-specific approach of the tribunal ap-
pears to be an alter ego of the much derided nature over purpose approach 
in CSOB.  It is also a decidedly pro-investor approach.  We see this in the 
tribunal’s reluctance to attach substantial weight to the broader context 
in which BUCG may have operated in its treatment of both limbs of the 
Broches test. 
When placed in its proper context, it would appear that BUCG’s op-
erations were very much part of the Chinese government’s SOE inter-
nationalisation policy – a policy prosaically referred to as the ‘going out 
strategy’ which required State-owned entities in China to cultivate cross 
border links for the actualisation of China’s foreign and economic policy 
goals.109 This is in fact borne out in the Yemeni state’s submissions on the 
structural links between the entity (BUCG) and the apparatus of the Chi-
nese state, including its administration and supervision by several organs 
of the Chinese state and the presence of Communist party representatives 
on its board. It is precisely for this reason that there are several multilat-
eral instruments like the OECD guidelines for the Corporate Governance 
of State-Owned Entities110 and the Santiago Principles for SWFs111 that em-
phasise amongst other things the need for operational independence and 
a functional separation between State-owned entities and the apparatus of 
their owner states. It would therefore appear that the tribunal’s parochial 
fixation on the ‘particular investment’ disregards a crucial line of inquiry 
which may have unearthed the true motivations behind BUCG’s interna-
tionalisation drive and helped to explain whether the entity was acting as 
an agent or carrying out the policy diktats of its owner state.
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Implications for SWFs and SOEs
What does this all mean for SWFs and SOEs? At first, it appears that 
these investors are entitled to pursue treaty-based claims before Invest-
ment tribunals. However, they are faced with two major jurisdictional 
hurdles. The first involves an analysis of whether the SWF or SOE is a cov-
ered investor under the investment treaty between its owner state and its 
host. The second involves the jurisdictional bar in article 25(1) of the ICSID 
convention which proscribes the adjudication of state-to-state disputes by 
ICSID tribunals. This creates severe difficulties for entities of a sovereign 
or state-owned nature like SWFs and SOEs. In deciding whether a state-
owned entity has locus standi to pursue its claims under ICSID, it appears 
that an ICSID tribunal would have to conduct an analysis of the Broches 
Test which calls for a two-part inquiry into whether the concerned entity 
was acting as an agent of its home state or whether it was discharging an 
essentially governmental function. An affirmative finding on either count 
defeats a state-owned entity’s claim to standing before an ICSID tribunal. 
However, arbitral jurisprudence in CSOB v Slovakia and BUCG v Yemen 
suggests that ICSID tribunals are often inclined to allow standing to these 
entities and will normally do so through a decidedly pro-investor analysis 
of the Broches test. 
Concluding Remarks 
This Chapter set out to explore the possibility of SOEs and SWFs as 
claimants under International Investment Treaties and the ICSID conven-
tion. It began with an analysis of the nature of these entities and their oper-
ations. The chapter found that SWFs and SOEs are established for a variety 
of policy purposes which include the stabilisation of national economies 
and engagement in sectors of strategic importance to owner states. Increas-
ingly also, state-owned behemoths play a significant role in global capi-
tal markets through their acquisition of trophy assets across various parts 
of the globe. This formally sovereign and functionally private nature has 
provoked controversy in host states ranging from National security fears 
to concerns about market distortion and uncompetitive practices. Also, 
several host states are increasingly adopting policy measures which target 
the investments of these entities for national security reviews. The chapter 
further argued that the highly charged and febrile regulatory environment 
in which these entities operate raise fears of arbitrary and discriminatory 
treatment which may adversely affect their investments and operations. 
This raises the question of protective safeguards for SWFs and SOEs to 
which international investment law provides a plausible option.
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In considering international Investment Law as an avenue for the pro-
tection of SWFs, the chapter tackled two jurisdictional conundrums. The 
first involved the question of protection for SWFs and SOEs under interna-
tional investment agreements entered into by their home and host states. 
The second involved standing before investment tribunals such as ICSID. 
In the context of the former, the Chapter revealed the binary approach 
of contemporary IIAs. On the one hand, some IIAs provide explicit cover-
age for SWFs as investors and would therefore extend treaty-based pro-
tections directly to these entities. On the other, certain IIAs are more latent 
on the question of coverage for SWFs and SOEs, meaning that a tribunal 
would have to adjudicate over any possible extension of treaty-based pro-
tection. Recent commentary however suggests that tribunals are likely to 
adopt a laissez-faire approach in such determinations.  
Regarding the second jurisdictional hurdle, the Chapter tried to posi-
tion SOEs and SWFs as claimants under the ICSID convention.  This in it-
self raised additional questions. For one, the convention creates difficulties 
for state-owned entities given its absolute bar to state-state dispute reso-
lution. It however appears that SWFs and SOEs can still gain standing to 
these tribunals by scaling through the Broches test which calls for a two-
part inquiry into whether the entity was acting as an agent of the state or 
whether it was discharging an essentially governmental function. ICSID 
jurisprudence on the test appears to be decidedly pro-investor, with tribu-
nals adopting a rather narrow focus on the nature of the investment and 
not its purpose or the SOE’s broader role within the policy framework of its 
owner state. Taken together, it would appear that SWFs and SOEs have a 
realistic prospect of pursuing treaty-based claims against host states before 
ICSID tribunals.   
